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Social Sustainability in Developing Country Suppliers:  




Purpose: To investigate why developing country suppliers are adopting socially sustainable practices 
and how the implementation process is both impeded and enabled. 
Design/methodology/approach: A multi-case study approach is adopted based on four Ready Made 
Garment (RMG) industry suppliers in Bangladesh and the Bangladeshi buying houses of two large 
UK retailers. The primary mode of data collection is exploratory face-to-face interviews with 14 
senior representatives. Findings are later interpreted using the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
theory lens. 
Findings: One factor motivating implementation is labour retention – a skilled labour shortage means 
employees will migrate to other factories if suppliers do not improve certain social standards. Barriers 
to implementation include a misalignment between the requirements of Western codes of conduct and 
the cultural and socio-economic context in Bangladesh. Enablers include a shift from auditing and 
monitoring to more open dialogue and trust between buyers and suppliers. We also reveal evidence of 
mock compliance, e.g. suppliers keeping two sets of timesheets, and of the complexities of social 
sustainability. For example, while some initiatives are unanimously positive, removing child labour 
from RMG industry suppliers has simply diverted it to other, less regulated and more hazardous 
industries like construction.  
Research implications: An early, exploratory contribution is provided. The work could be extended, 
e.g. to other stakeholders like third-party auditors and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). 
Practical implications: Being aware of the motivations, barriers and enablers will help Multi-
National Corporations (MNCs) promote good practice and anticipate the challenges they are likely to 
face in improving the social sustainability of their supply chains. Use of TCE leads to suggesting 
MNCs need to move beyond immediate suppliers and incorporate tier-two suppliers in their 
implementation efforts. 
Social implications: Social sustainability improvements should benefit vulnerable workers, help 
suppliers develop longer term relationships with MNCs, and contribute to economic growth. 
Originality/value: Most prior studies have been in the context of developed countries and focused on 
the perspective of the buying firm only.  
 
Keywords: Social Sustainability; Developing Country Suppliers; Ready Made Garments Industry; 
Bangladesh; Exploratory Case Study; Transaction Cost Economics. 




Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) face intense scrutiny on the sustainability of their 
economic, social and environmental performance. Interested parties range from employees, 
customers and trade associations to government agencies and Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) (Vachon and Klassen, 2006, Meehan and Bryde, 2011, Yakovleva et 
al., 2011). This scrutiny applies not only to their own performance, but to that of their 
upstream supply chain partners (Vachon and Klassen, 2006, Seuring and Müller, 2008b, 
Walker and Jones, 2012). For example, companies like Nike, Disney, Benetton and Adidas 
have been held responsible for the behaviour of their suppliers, e.g. when they harm the 
environment (Preuss, 2001) or violate labour laws (Graafland, 2002). As a result, 
environmental and social sustainability considerations are now fundamental to the purchasing 
and sourcing decisions made in MNCs (Carter and Rogers, 2008, Vachon and Klassen, 2008, 
Pagell and Wu, 2009). 
This paper presents an exploratory study of social sustainability – which is concerned with 
the human side of sustainability, including human rights (e.g. child labour and freedom of 
association), health & safety (e.g. safe working conditions and training), and community (e.g. 
charitable, philanthropic initiatives) – in the Ready Made Garments (RMG) industry of 
Bangladesh based on 4 Bangladeshi suppliers and the Bangladeshi buying houses of 2 major 
MNCs with headquarters in the UK. It is a timely study, given recent events in this sector in 
Bangladesh. On the 24th of April 2013, the Rana Plaza building that housed five Bangladeshi 
apparel factories making clothes for Western brands such as Primark and Benetton collapsed, 
killing 1,129 people (BBC, 2013a, Guardian, 2013, Huffington Post, 2013). This was by far 
the deadliest disaster in the history of the apparel industry and followed shortly after two fires 
in November 2012 and January 2013 that killed 112 workers and 7 workers, respectively in 
Bangladeshi factories supplying Wal-Mart and SEARS (Bloomberg, 2012) and Inditex, the 
world's largest clothing retailer (New York Times, 2013).  
Although there is a considerable literature on the environmental aspect of sustainability, 
work on the social aspect of sustainability lags behind (Carter and Rogers, 2008, Seuring and 
Müller, 2008a, Pullman and Dillard, 2010, Reuter et al., 2010, Sarkis et al., 2010). Social 
sustainability has only recently joined the mainstream management literature, driven by 
enhanced sensitivity in the developed world to ethical issues (Harrison and Freeman, 1999, 
Quazi and O'brien, 2000) and the business case for social reform: improvements in social 
sustainability have been linked to an increase in competitiveness (Porter and Kramer, 2006, 
2011). Yet many MNCs are struggling with the management of social sustainability issues in 
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their supply chains (Klassen and Vereecke, 2012) and successfully implementing improved 
conditions in upstream suppliers is a key contemporary challenge (Matos and Hall, 2007). 
The Operations and Supply Chain Management literature on social sustainability is 
extremely limited (Daugherty, 2011, Gimenez and Tachizawa, 2012). Most studies to date 
have been conducted in the context of developed countries (Luken, 2006, Hussain et al., 
2012) despite the obvious relevance to developing countries, where the impact of businesses 
on the poor has been mixed (Dobers and Halme, 2009, Werner, 2009). Many contributions 
have also focused exclusively on the perspective of the buying firm; the supplier’s viewpoint 
requires further attention. It therefore follows that there is a need to conduct further research 
into social sustainability, particularly in the context of developing country suppliers to 
MNCs, as called for by Ehrgott et al. (2011) and Gimenez and Tachizawa (2012). Studying 
developing country suppliers is particularly important as they often find it difficult to 
incorporate Western style social standards in their factories, e.g. due to cultural differences 
(Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005, Gugler and Shi, 2009).  
This exploratory study seeks to identify: (a) the reasons why developing country suppliers 
are adopting socially sustainable practices; and, (b) how the implementation process is both 
facilitated and impeded.  In doing so, it makes three novel contributions to the field. First, it 
focuses on social sustainability, which is an under-researched area in general. Second, it 
provides an insight into the realities of implementing social sustainability in a developing 
country and in the context of a particularly labour intensive industry. And third, it provides 
not only the Western buyers’ perspective but also the developing country suppliers’ 
perspective, which is often neglected in the literature. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. A brief literature review is provided 
in Section 2 before the research method is outlined in Section 3. Findings are presented in 
sections 4-6 and relate to the: (i) key factors motivating implementation; (ii) social 
sustainability implementation process in which a number of barriers to implementation are 
highlighted; and, (iii) enablers or facilitators of successful implementation. In Section 7, we 
use Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory as a lens to interpret our findings – organised 
around three propositions on TCE from Grover and Malhotra (2003) – before the paper 
concludes with Section 8. 
 
2. Literature Review  
An overview of key social sustainability literature is provided in Section 2.1 below, which 
includes research on social sustainability in relation to buyers and suppliers and in the context 
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of developed and developing countries.  Section 2.2 then presents a discussion on theory used 
in prior work and, in particular, on the theoretical underpinnings of Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE) – the theoretical lens we later adopt to explain findings from our 
exploratory study. Finally, an assessment of the literature follows in Section 2.3, where the 
main research gaps are identified and our research questions are formulated. 
 
2.1 Operations and Supply Chain Management Literature on Social Sustainability  
While many definitions of sustainability in general exist, one central concept is Elkington’s 
(1998) Triple Bottom Line (TBL), which combines environmental, social, and economic 
performance. Hence, social sustainability is a component of the TBL (Kleindorfer et al., 
2005) and deals with the management of human and societal capital (Sarkis et al., 2010). It 
pertains to forming and preserving fair management practices towards labour, communities 
and regions in the supply chain (Sloan, 2010). Here, we suggest social sustainability is a 
holistic concept that: (i) must consider the other TBL components, i.e. it is not implemented 
in isolation and must be integrated with economic and environmental performance 
considerations; (ii) recognises stakeholders within and beyond the supply chain; and, (iii) 
attempts to ensure long-term benefit for society. There are various tools for implementing 
social sustainability, ranging from a firm’s own socially responsible practices or code of 
conduct, to third-party standards and supplier development programmes. 
 The Operations Management literature on social sustainability has included: links with 
logistics & purchasing activities (Carter et al., 2000a, Carter et al., 2000b, Carter and 
Jennings, 2002b, a); sustainable supply chain governance models (Vurro et al., 2009); and, 
comparative studies on how broad Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policies, which 
include social sustainability, have been adapted by leading firms in different regions 
(Welford, 2004, 2005, Welford and Frost, 2006). Research has also investigated the use of 
social sustainability-based policies and practices in specific industries, particularly labour 
intensive industries like food (e.g. Manning et al., 2006, Spence and Bourlakis, 2009, 
Pullman and Dillard, 2010) and apparel (e.g. Tencati et al., 2008, Yu, 2008, Burchielli et al., 
2009, Svensson, 2009, Illge and Preuss, 2012). 
Much of the available literature is in the context of developed rather than developing 
countries and has focused on the buying firm only, as will be evident from the discussion 
below. As a result, most models of social sustainability are based on Western experiences 
(Fox, 2004) and do not consider the cultural, market and technological environments of 
developing countries (Quazi and O'brien, 2000, Belal and Momin, 2009, Hossain and Rowe, 
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2011). Moreover, there is only limited understanding of how MNCs should construct or 
diffuse socially sustainable practices across suppliers (Carter and Rogers, 2008, Castka and 
Balzarova, 2008). It is therefore unsurprising that embedding MNC codes of conduct and 
third-party certifications in developing country suppliers is extremely challenging (Gugler 
and Shi, 2009). There is a clear need to understand what motivates suppliers to implement 
socially sustainable practices and how implementation is both impeded and facilitated. The 
first two of the following subsections review what is already known about this process from 
the existing literature in developed and developing countries considering the perspective of 
buyers and suppliers, where possible. 
 
2.1.1 Research on Social Sustainability in Buyers & Suppliers: Developed Countries 
Research in developed countries includes Burchielli et al. (2009), Awaysheh and Klassen 
(2010), Elg and Hultman (2011) and Walker and Jones (2012). But none of these papers 
incorporated the perspective of suppliers to the focal buying firm. First, Burchielli et al. 
(2009) conducted a case study of the Australian FairWear Campaign (FWC), identifying how 
appropriate regulations can create ethical supply networks. Second, Awaysheh and Klassen 
(2010) conducted a survey of Canadian managers in three industries, finding greater physical 
distance from the buyer and a lack of law enforcement lead to lower social sustainability 
implementation in suppliers, and that better supply chain transparency can help mitigate these 
problems. Third, Elg and Hultman (2011) surveyed Swedish retailers and compared them 
with best practice in Sweden in the form of Ikea’s sustainability programme. Most recently, 
Walker and Jones (2012) identified the internal and external barriers and enablers to the TBL 
through a literature review and case studies of 7 leading UK companies. Enablers included: 
customer/stakeholder pressures; a desire to minimise reputational risk; the need to align 
purchasing and corporate strategies; collaboration with suppliers; top management 
commitment; competitive advantages gained from being sustainable; and, inter-departmental 
cooperation. Meanwhile, barriers included: limited resources; low prices offered by buyers; 
lack of management and supplier commitment; and, communication problems & cultural 
mismatch with suppliers in different locations. While the authors provided a valuable 
contribution, they conceded that their work concentrated on large buying firms and that there 
was a need to research buyer-supplier dyads, thereby integrating the (typically smaller) 
supplier’s perspective. 
Few papers have focused on the problems faced by suppliers in improving social standards 
(e.g. Jorgensen and Knudsen, 2006, Baden et al., 2009, Ciliberti et al., 2009). First, Jorgensen 
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and Knudsen (2006) surveyed the Sustainable Supply Chain Management (SSCM) practices 
of 300 Danish Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs), elaborating the concept of 
governance in global value chains. Second, Baden et al. (2009) found the attitude of UK 
SME owners/managers to be a key factor motivating social improvements. Finally, Ciliberti 
et al. (2009) studied SA8000 implementations – the global social accountability standard 
encouraging firms to develop and maintain socially acceptable workplace practices – by 
Italian SMEs, finding information asymmetry and transaction costs decrease when the most 
powerful supply chain partner implements the standard. 
 
2.1.2 Research on Social Sustainability in Buyers & Suppliers: Developing Countries 
Beschorner and Müller (2007) highlighted the prominent role played by stakeholder pressure 
in motivating social sustainability in developing countries. Similarly, pressure from buyers 
who make socially sustainable practices an order qualifier was highlighted in Luken and 
Stares (2005). Other key developing country studies include those by Kortelainen (2008), 
Tencati et al. (2008), Lim and Phillips (2008), Yu (2008), and Lee and Kim (2009). 
Kortelainen (2008) used case studies in Chinese high-technology industries to evaluate 
whether auditing labour conditions is effective for improving social standards, concluding 
that it is beneficial but that auditors needed to update their skill set. Meanwhile, Tencati et al. 
(2008) focused on the impact of sustainable sourcing policies on 25 Vietnamese suppliers to 
EU and US MNCs. The authors concluded that although there is a business case for 
sustainability, practices tend to be imposed on suppliers in such a manner that they cannot be 
maintained in the long-run; and that a supportive approach is needed, based on collaboration 
and education.  
Importantly, both Lim and Phillips (2008) and Yu (2008) focused on dyadic relationships 
between developed country MNCs and developing country suppliers in the footwear industry. 
First, Lim and Phillips (2008) presented a case study analysis on four of Nike’s Korean and 
Taiwanese suppliers finding an arms-length approach to implementing codes of conduct to be 
ineffective. Instead, collaboration and offering compliant suppliers minimum order quantity 
incentives facilitated implementation. Second, Yu (2008) conducted an explanatory study on 
the implementation of Reebok’s labour-related code of conduct at a major Chinese supplier. 
The author identified barriers to implementation, including: the buyer’s intentions to reduce 
costs and not share in the expense of implementation; competition amongst suppliers; and, a 
lack of government enforcement of labour laws. Yu (2008) suggested two possible solutions: 
cost sharing and combining the regulatory power of voluntary codes with compulsory state 
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legislation. Finally, Lee and Kim (2009) studied CSR in Korea’s electronics industry, also 
finding legal requirements to be an important driver. 
 
2.2 Theory in the Social Sustainability Research Reviewed 
Relatively few researchers have used theory when studying social sustainability, as noted by 
Carter and Easton (2011) in the broader context of SSCM research. The few theories that 
have been used include: stakeholder theory (Belal, 2002, Pagell et al., 2010, Park-Poaps and 
Rees, 2010, Liu et al., 2011, Wu and Pagell, 2011); the Resource Based View (RBV) (Carter 
and Rogers, 2008, Pagell et al., 2010); Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Carter and 
Rogers, 2008, Jiang, 2009, Pagell et al., 2010); structuration theory (Pullman and Dillard, 
2010); and, contingency theory (Walker and Jones, 2012). For example, Belal (2002) used 
stakeholder theory to consider the extent to which social audits meet stakeholder needs. The 
author made a distinction between stakeholder management, where a supplier does just 
enough to keep a customer loyal, and stakeholder accountability, where the supplier 
genuinely commits to the customer’s values and feels a deeper social responsibility. Some 
authors have combined theories, including the aforementioned stakeholder theory. For 
example, Pagell et al. (2010) found that the RBV and TCE provide conflicting explanations 
for the evolving use of purchasing portfolios in SSCM, but that stakeholder theory can help to 
reconcile the two perspectives.  
Other uses of theory include Walker and Jones (2012), who used contingency theory to 
develop a typology of approaches to SSCM and investigate factors influencing SSCM. A 
final example is Jiang (2009), who applied TCE to develop and justify a conceptual model 
that explains how governance relationships lead to supplier compliance with codes of conduct. 
The author tested the model using data from compliant and non-compliant suppliers, 
concluding that non-compliance is often caused by the buying firm, such as by conducting an 
audit and leaving a supplier with an unrealistic set of problems to resolve with no assistance. 
Although it was applied by Jiang (2009),  Carter and Easton (2011) found that TCE is one of 
the lesser used theories in the study of sustainability in supply chain management and that 
this presents an opportunity for future research. Moreover, TCE has been identified as an 
effective tool for evaluating buyer-supplier relationships by Grover and Malhotra (2003). 
Similarly, our findings in sections 4, 5 & 6 will also demonstrate that TCE is a useful lens for 
understanding the phenomenon of social sustainability implementation in developing country 
suppliers by developed country buyers. In the following section, we briefly outline TCE, its 
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main constructs and three propositions that we will later return to after presenting our 
exploratory study (see Section 7). 
 
2.2.1 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) Theory 
The initial TCE framework was proposed by Coase (1937) and further developed by 
Williamson (e.g. Williamson, 1971, 1975, 1985), who suggested that transaction costs consist 
of both the direct costs of managing relationships and the opportunity costs of making poor or 
inferior decisions. TCE makes two key assumptions about human behaviour (Williamson and 
Ghani, 2012): (i) bounded rationality (from Simon, 1957), i.e. that decision makers are 
limited by their cognitive, communication and information processing capabilities, which 
might lead to additional costs (Williamson, 1975, 1985); and, (ii) opportunism, which 
indicates that decision makers may, out of self-interest, behave dishonestly or violate 
agreements (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997), meaning firms have to incur partner monitoring or 
asset safeguarding costs to tackle the problem.  
Key constructs of TCE include: asset specificity, uncertainty, and governance mechanisms 
(Grover and Malhotra, 2003). Asset specificity refers to the transferability of assets supporting 
a transaction, and can be either human (e.g. training) or physical (e.g. equipment investment) 
specificity. Costs that have little or no value outside a certain exchange relationship are 
highly asset-specific investments. Uncertainty refers to unexpected changes in circumstance 
surrounding a transaction and can be either ex ante, i.e. environmental uncertainty (e.g. 
uncontrollable problems at the contract agreement stage) or ex post, i.e. behavioural 
uncertainty (e.g. performance evaluation problems). Finally, governance mechanisms refer to 
the processes and structures used to ensure the strategies and objectives of different parties 
are aligned (Oshri et al., 2011, pp 178). Governance may be either market or hierarchically 
oriented, although hybrid forms have also been suggested (e.g. Powell, 1990, Williamson, 
2008). In market governance, the coordination of goods and services occurs through demand 
and supply forces. Under hierarchical (or vertical) governance, there is a dominant entity that 
controls and directs the flow of materials and services.  
The analysis of our data in Section 7 is organised around three key propositions on TCE 
for the operations and supply chain management field by Grover and Malhotra (2003, pp. 
460) and summarised in the following: “Bounded rationality and opportunism give rise to 
transaction costs. These costs are higher under conditions of high asset specificity and high 
uncertainty. The most efficient governance mechanism (markets or firm) needs to be chosen 
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to organise economic activity. In general, lower transaction costs favour markets, while 
higher transaction costs favour hierarchies” (Grover and Malhotra, 2003). 
 
2.3 Assessment of the Literature 
To conclude, the following gaps can be identified from the literature: 
• Most prior research has been conducted in the context of developed countries. Further 
research is required in developing countries, e.g. to understand the extent to which codes 
of conduct developed in the West apply to developing country suppliers with different 
cultural and socio-economic values; and, how they can be effectively implemented. 
• Much research has focused exclusively on buyers, typically MNCs. Further research is 
required that captures both the buyer and supplier perspectives of social sustainability. 
• Few prior studies have made use of theory. Further research is required in which theory is 
used, e.g. to interpret and improve understanding of empirical evidence.  
 
In response, this exploratory paper investigates the implementation of socially sustainable 
practices in a developing country context – incorporating the views of suppliers and buyers –
to understand the ground realities of the process. Our findings are later interpreted using the 
Transaction Cost Economics theory lens, as introduced above. We begin with the following 
three research questions (RQs), which are also illustrated in Figure 1: 
RQ1:   Why are developing country suppliers adopting socially sustainable practices? 
RQ2:   How is the achievement of social sustainability impeded?  
RQ3: How can the implementation of social sustainability be facilitated? 
 
[Take in Figure 1] 
 
3. Research Method 
An exploratory case study of 4 Bangladeshi suppliers in the Ready Made Garments (RMG) 
industry has been undertaken, supplemented by the Bangladeshi buying houses of 2 major 
UK retailers. Section 3.1 describes the research context before Section 3.2 justifies the choice 
of method; finally, Section 3.3 outlines the data collection and analysis procedure. 
 
3.1 Research Context – Ready Made Garments (RMG) Industry in Bangladesh 
Social conditions in the labour intensive RMG industry have been the subject of much public 
scrutiny (Emmelhainz and Adams, 1999, De Brito et al., 2008, Maccarthy and Jayarathne, 
2011). Bangladesh is one of the world’s least developed countries with a high population 
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density and high level of poverty; it is vulnerable to climate change and has inefficient 
institutional aspects (Huq and Ayers, 2008). Yet Bangladesh has shown tremendous growth 
in the RMG industry (McKinsey, 2011) with exports of $19billion in 2012, second only to 
China (BBC, 2013b). The sector’s economic performance has not, however, led to a 
proportionate increase in social performance. For example, Akhter et al. (2010) reported poor 
hygiene standards, a shortage of drinking water and recreational facilities, and the sexual 
harassment of women, who make up the majority of RMG industry employees.  And, 
alarmingly, in a span of just two years, there has been a series of deadly incidents resulting 
from failures to improve social conditions, including factory collapses and fires. Not 
surprisingly, much global attention is now focused on the need to improve social standards in 
the RMG sector of Bangladesh. The RMG industry in Bangladesh therefore provides a rich 
and appropriate setting for exploring our research questions. 
  
3.2 Multiple Case Study Approach 
The infancy of social sustainability research calls for an exploratory study (Saunders et al., 
2009). Conducting exploratory research through the case study method is appropriate when a 
phenomena is at the developmental stage and its variables have not been properly identified 
(Voss, 2008). Case studies allow for a thorough analysis of a phenomenon in a real-life 
situation and can provide in-depth insight (Eisenhardt, 1989, Yin, 2009). They enable the 
elicitation of rich data through a variety of techniques, including interviews, observations and 
document analysis, allowing for cross-validation (Yin, 2009).  
The majority of case study sustainability research is based on a single case and stage of the 
supply chain (Seuring, 2008, Carter and Easton, 2011). But multi-case research can be 
appropriate when exploring new areas; it can augment external validity, guard against 
observer bias (Handfield and Melnyk, 1998; Voss, 2008; Barratt et al. 2011), aid 
triangulation, and – to a degree – improve generality (Voss 2008; Yin, 2009). It can help 
create more robust and testable theories than those based on single cases (Eisenhardt, 1989, 
Meredith, 1993, Yin, 2009). We adopt a multi-case study approach based on four 
Bangladeshi RMG industry suppliers, where each is a case. This core set of cases is 
supplemented by evidence from the Bangladeshi buying houses of two major UK apparel 
retailers with annual sales in excess of £9bn and £3bn in 2011. The retailers buy from two of 
the suppliers, thereby aiding triangulation. All of the companies involved in the study meet 
the following criteria: (i) they are involved in the RMG industry; (ii) they have a physical 
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presence in Bangladesh, i.e. a factory or buying house; and (iii) they supply international 
customers or are international customers that buy goods from Bangladesh. 
 
3.3 Data Collection and Analysis 
The firms chosen for this study met the criteria above, but they were also chosen because we 
were confident of gaining good access to rich data. The primary mode of data collection has 
been interviews; other methods employed included factory tours and secondary data 
collection, e.g. from audit reports. In total, 14 semi-structured face-to-face interviews have 
been conducted with owners and managers dealing with supply chain and human 
resource/social compliance issues across the four suppliers and two buyers. All interviews 
were recorded and transcribed. Interviewees were identified either through personal contacts 
or via referrals from a previous interviewee, ensuring participants were both accessible and 
cooperative (Bryman and Bell, 2007, Malhotra and Birks, 2007). Personal contacts helped to 
gain trust and enable ‘frank and open’ discussions – as will be demonstrated by our rich and 
candid data – which would otherwise have been difficult given the sensitive nature of the 
topic. By the end of the fourteenth interview, the value added per interview was minimal and 
we were arguably approaching saturation. All of the interviews and factory tours were 
undertaken by one of the authors of this paper, who is a native of Bangladesh. 
The four suppliers are hereafter referred to as suppliers A to D and the two buyers as 
Buyer 1 and Buyer 2. An overview of the companies and interviewees is provided in Table I, 
which also indicates example buyers/suppliers. For example, Buyer 1 and Buyer 2 are 
customers of Supplier C, while Buyer 2 is a customer of Supplier D. Some customers, 
including buyers 1 and 2, have their own code of conduct that suppliers must adhere to; 
others simply expect suppliers to be accredited by an international third-party, like 
Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production (WRAP) or the Supplier Ethical Data 
Exchange (SEDEX).  
 
[Take in Table I] 
 
Multiple steps have been taken to ensure reliability and validity (Bryman and Bell, 2007, 
Yin, 2009). The interviews were conducted in two rounds, which improved the focus of the 
research, allowed for follow-up questions, and helped identify possible future research areas 
(Van Teijlingen and Hundley, 2001, Bryman and Bell, 2007). Transcripts from each case 
were analysed individually before cross-case analysis of suppliers, buyers and dyads was 
undertaken to identify common themes (Creswell, 2009, Barratt et al., 2011); tables were 
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constructed to support the process of searching for patterns in the data (Hartley, 2004). 
Finally, it is important to be aware of potential biases when analysing case study data. Most 
prominently, there was the potential that interviewees from suppliers in particular would 
exaggerate their degree of social sustainability to put their company in a positive light. This 
was considered while interpreting the data and drawing conclusions. But, in general, this did 
not appear to be a problem – the interviewees were generally extremely open about their 
shortcomings. 
Next, we outline the study’s findings, identifying factors motivating social sustainability, 
and the barriers and enablers to implementation in sections 4, 5 and 6, respectively.  
 
4. Why are Socially Sustainable Practices being Adopted? (RQ1) 
The key motivators, barriers and enablers of social sustainability implementation for each 
case are presented in Table II. The table also indicates whether a factor has previously been 
identified in the literature or is, to the best of our knowledge, presented here for the first time. 
The following four subsections summarise the key factors motivating social sustainability 
implementation in the four suppliers; barriers and enablers will be discussed in sections 5 and 
6. 
 
[Take in Table II] 
 
4.1 External Stakeholder Pressure 
A wide range of stakeholders are present in the RMG industry, including buyers, media, 
consumers, trade associations, NGOs and the government; and external stakeholders are a 
key motivational factor for all four suppliers. The first four stakeholders in particular have 
been major driving forces. Most prominently, buyers impose pressure by making certain 
social standards mandatory for a supplier to be considered for a contract. In 2005, the Multi-
Fibre Agreement (MFA) – a quota system established by the 1974 General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) – expired. This system had meant orders were proportionately 
distributed across regions and factories. But since 2005, buyers have been free to choose 
which suppliers they use, enabling them to exert greater coercive pressure over the practices 
suppliers employ. Supplier D’s Managing Director, for example, now described social 
compliance as being a “matter of survival”. Some of the suppliers are prospering in this free 
market, e.g. Supplier B has attracted important retailers like H&M. In contrast, Supplier A 




The pressure exerted by buyers to tighten up standards across the supply chain has been 
influenced by other stakeholders – like the media and consumer expectations, e.g. in Europe 
and the US. Supplier B’s Deputy Managing Director explained that “the eyes of the world are 
on Bangladesh’s garments sector ... we [Bangladesh] are exporting more than $20 billion 
worth of garments per year. We are pressurised by buyers [to improve] and they are 
pressured by the media [who influence public/customer perceptions]”. To facilitate improved 
standards, some buyers actively train suppliers. For example, Supplier B’s Human Resource 
(HR) Manager had attended programmes run by MNCs like SEARS, K-Mart and H&M, 
where buyers introduce their company’s code of conduct, provide guidance on how to adhere, 
and inform suppliers of recent changes to a code. 
In addition, the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) 
– a trade body representing woven, knit and sweater garment manufacturers and exporters – 
plays a mediating role in supplier development. The BGMEA inspects suppliers to ensure, for 
example, that children are not employed. Where necessary, fines are imposed and, in extreme 
cases, suppliers lose their BGMEA membership status, affecting their credibility and order 
winning capabilities. Like some buyers, the BGMEA and other similar associations also run 
supplier workshops. 
In contrast, lesser roles are currently played by NGOs and the government. Most suppliers 
could not attribute any benefits to the work of NGOs; one even commented that some NGOs 
are corrupt – threatening to incite workforce unrest unless they were paid bribes. But this 
contradicts both buyers who felt that NGOs play an important role in training and raising 
awareness. Meanwhile, the general consensus across suppliers and buyers was that the 
government does not play a large enough role, and that there is again a problem with 
corruption. This, it was argued, is most prominent in the government’s labour agency which 
checks suppliers comply with labour laws yet, it was claimed, regularly takes bribes to ignore 
violations. We will return to the problem of corruption when we discuss the implementation 
process in Section 5. 
 
4.2 Owner Characteristics 
Owner attitudes in the supplying factories play a role and are shaped by their experience, 
education and professional background. All but one of the owners and directors interviewed 
had received overseas education, and some had prior work experience in a MNC. Most felt 
that complying with social standards was now a minimum requirement and agreed with their 
customers that workers’ rights and comforts should be respected. Supplier D, for example, 
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goes beyond compliance by having aisle widths between rows of machinists double the legal 
requirements. It was claimed that this is because of the owner’s positive attitude. Many 
owners also exerted philanthropic characteristics, e.g. providing financial aid to employees 
with sick relatives and sponsoring the education of employees’ high-achieving children. 
Supplier A’s owner even gave employees a month’s wages to aid recovery after a fire 
destroyed many of their homes. 
 
4.3 Competition amongst Suppliers, including for Skilled Labour 
Competition amongst suppliers also motivates improvements. There is of course competition 
for orders, heightened by the free market described above. But there is also competition for 
labour, as highlighted in the cases of suppliers B and D. High global demand for garments 
from developing countries like Bangladesh have led to an increase in the number of factories; 
this, in turn, has led to a significant RMG industry labour shortage. Therefore, employees 
have greater power and factories must improve their standards or risk losing their best 
workers to other factories offering better conditions. For example, Supplier B’s Managing 
Director stated that: “As an industry, we have a tremendous shortage of workers ... If we are 
not socially compliant, the workers won’t come to our factory … Competition to get workers 
amongst the factories is forcing us to be compliant”. Hence, in addition to top-down drivers, 
there is also a bottom-up push for social sustainability improvements that are valued by 
employees. 
 
4.4 Economic Benefits of Social Sustainability 
The above suggests improvements are influenced by factors like goodwill and the need to 
compete for qualified labour. While this is true, social sustainability is also increasingly 
viewed as having a positive impact on productivity – hence, improvements can be good for 
business. In fact, there is evidence from all four suppliers and both buyers that social 
sustainability can lead to economic benefits. Suppliers are increasingly aware, for example, 
that low social standards lead to higher sickness rates and worker absences, which reduce 
output. Indeed, Supplier A recently paid for Hepatitis C (HCV) tests for its workforce 
because such diseases are common in Bangladesh. The Managing Director explained that: 
“You may be surprised that from around 700 workers, 28 actually had this disease.” These 
initiatives also contribute to worker retention, which cuts training costs as well as being good 
for productivity. Meanwhile, it was argued by Buyer 1’s Compliance Executive that being 
socially sustainable helps attract bigger customers and secure more lucrative contracts. 
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Not all RMG industry suppliers in Bangladesh are convinced that social sustainability 
makes economic sense. The owners of our four suppliers suggested that some other factories 
do not wish to go beyond compliance and view implementation as a cost, not an investment. 
These owners were now causing friction between factories. For example, Supplier B had 
received a request from a neighbouring factory to stop providing transport for employees to 
and from the factory as workers in the neighbouring factory were now demanding the same 
service. Presumably, the owner did not want this extra expense but feared losing their staff as 
a consequence (see Section 4.3 above). 
 
5. Implementing Social Sustainability: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly (RQ2) 
Section 4 summarised key factors motivating improved social standards in RMG industry 
suppliers in Bangladesh, where a key pressure was from buyers. The key components of a 
code of conduct (or third-party certification) used by buyers to diffuse social sustainability 
into their supply chain relate to: employee wages & benefits, child & forced labour, 
workplace harassment, and working hours & conditions. When auditing suppliers, buyers 
typically have two main criteria: technical and social compliance. If the supplier passes the 
preliminary technical audit, a social audit team completes an in-depth assessment. Social 
audits typically involve reviewing the manufacturer’s labour standards (e.g. documents 
regarding labour contracts, working hours and company policies) and inspecting working 
conditions, including health and safety issues. In addition, following the recent Rana Plaza 
disaster, some buyers like Tesco and Benetton have promised to conduct surveys to examine 
the structural integrity of buildings, even though this is normally the responsibility of 
government inspectors (Telegraph, 2013, Huffington Post, 2013).  Audits are often pre-
arranged, but checks on existing suppliers can occur randomly or be completely 
unannounced; and auditors may question employees privately. If only a minor violation is 
found, a supplier may be given a 1-year approval, followed by another audit. If a major 
violation is found, a buyer may withhold orders and give the supplier 3-6 months to rectify 
conditions. Typically, a supplier will only fail altogether if there is a serious violation, e.g. 
child labour. Audits may be conducted by the buyer directly or by a third-party auditor. 
Against this backdrop, the remainder of this section presents an insight into the barriers to 
implementing social sustainability, before Section 6 focuses on how implementation can be 
enabled. 
 
5.1 The Good – Positive Outcomes from Becoming Socially Sustainable 
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Buyers’ codes of conduct are displayed in the local language – Bangla – on the shop floors of 
suppliers A, B and D together with contact details for a representative from each buyer. 
Employees can therefore contact a buyer directly if they have a grievance. In Supplier B, for 
example, employees also have free access to a doctor and to proper safety equipment, which 
was not the case prior to the codes being implemented. All the suppliers must also educate 
employees on their rights and provide them with a handbook. Auditors check these measures 
are in place, e.g. by questioning employees to assess how well they understand their rights, 
such as to a pay slip, sick leave, maternity leave, etc. These measures mean employees are 
more aware of what to expect, making them less vulnerable to exploitation. Supplier A’s HR 
Manager admitted that: “Five years ago, our workers didn’t even know what their basic 
salary or overtime rate was, but now the situation has changed drastically”. This has 
improved working standards for some of the most vulnerable groups of society, including low 
skilled, low paid (mostly female) employees. Child labour in the RMG industry has also 
reduced; for example, all four suppliers claimed to have removed child labour altogether. 
Implementing the above improvements is initially costly, but there is evidence that this has 
indeed led to increased productivity. Hence, there are benefits for employees and 
organisations. Supplier D’s HR Manager explained that the company owns two factories – 
one which has improved its standards and one which lags behind. He claimed that, with the 
same number of machines, the compliant factory is, on average, more productive than the 
non-compliant factory; and, that staff retention rates are higher. Compliant factories can also 
secure longer term orders from buyers, while Supplier D’s Managing Director suggested 
compliance has increased the firm’s bargaining power. He argued that: “We are in a stronger 
position to negotiate with buyers compared to a non-compliant factory which is on ‘the back 
foot’ from the very beginning.” He also stated that “buyers feel more secure that a compliant 
factory has a minimum level of performance and quality.” This was supported by the buying 
firms; for example, the Country Head of Buyer 1 explained how pioneering or early-
compliant factories have gained some first-mover advantages, strengthening their market 
position. 
 
5.2 The Bad – Negative Aspects of the Social Sustainability Implementation Process  
Implementing social sustainability is not all positive and here we pick out three examples of 
negative aspects of the process. First, the primary complaint in all four suppliers was that, 
although buyers want factories to improve standards, they will not share the costs of 
implementation and are continuing to drive down prices. For example, Supplier B’s Deputy 
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Managing Director pointed out: “It is a buyer’s market ... buyers are taking advantage of 
price wars between supplier factories. But if they buy cheap from Bangladesh, then the 
benefits to the workers and society will also be cheap.” He claimed that by failing to share 
costs or increase prices, buyers were not considering the long term viability of the suppliers 
or how improved standards could be maintained. Yet Buyer 1’s Supply Chain Manager felt 
that the prices they were paying were fair and could lead to improvements in social 
sustainability that also allowed suppliers to be economically sustainable. He questioned: “If 
they are not making a profit, then how are they running their factories?” Benefits in terms of 
greater bargaining power were earlier reported for Supplier D, but even this supplier 
complained about having to bear the costs of implementing social sustainability. 
Second, it was claimed that standards vary and are inconsistent. This includes across codes 
of conduct, where a particular supplier has to satisfy the standards of multiple buyers. But it 
also includes the inconsistent application of a particular standard during the auditing process. 
Third-party auditors were thought to have higher expectations than the buyers themselves; 
hence, a supplier’s rating may greatly depend on who conducts the audit. Third-party auditors 
were also viewed as being less understanding, e.g. of the difficulties of achieving compliance. 
Meanwhile, Supplier C’s HR Manager suggested that a third-party auditor may submit an 
unfavourable report so they can return in 3 months’ time to re-audit the supplier and receive 
another fee. It was also claimed some third-party auditors go to extreme lengths to detect 
code breaches to secure a second visit; and fraught relationships between suppliers and third-
party auditors are evident in several cases. For example, Supplier B’s Deputy Managing 
Director explained: “A few years ago, I had an auditor [third-party auditor] whose aim was to 
prove I was using excess overtime. But he could not find any proof ... eventually he took out 
my generator log book and saw that the generator was on at 8pm, which means my factory 
was still running when it shouldn’t have been. On that basis, he failed the factory.” 
Third, while social sustainability implementation has reduced child labour in Bangladesh’s 
RMG industry – which, in isolation, is extremely positive – it has diverted children to other, 
less regulated and often more dangerous industries like construction. For example, Supplier 
B’s Managing Director stated that: “By banning child labour from our industry, which is the 
most regulated in the country; we have actually shifted these children to more dangerous 
professions such as construction, which is not properly monitored.” This highlights the 
complexities of improving social sustainability in one particular industry when it is faced 




5.3 The Ugly – Mock Compliance and Corruption 
Much of the case study evidence points to mock compliance, where a supplier appears to be 
complying with a code of conduct but is in fact concealing non-compliance. All of the 
suppliers and buyers admitted to some form of mock compliance or were aware that some 
suppliers practiced mock compliance to pass audits. For example, some buyers require 
suppliers to close on Fridays – a public holiday in Bangladesh. Local law also states that 
employees should have at least one day’s leave per week, e.g. Fridays. Many factories open 
on Fridays nonetheless but conceal this from buyers and auditors. Similarly, the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) convention states that employees should not work more than eight 
hours per day, while local law limits overtime to two hours per day. However, again, working 
hour violations are common to meet output targets. While, at first glance, these practices may 
appear to exploit the workforce, overtime is actually welcomed by many employees as the 
hourly rate is higher and provides an important income supplement. In fact, Supplier C’s HR 
Manager was aware that employees often slow down towards the end of the week to ensure 
overtime is needed; and, if a company does not offer overtime, it risks losing its workforce to 
another factory. Hence, while some social reforms like sick pay are driven through by 
employees, others are held back. Supplier B’s Deputy Managing Director explained that: 
“Buyer XYZ [a major multinational retailer] only allows 8-hour shifts with 2 hours overtime 
per day. But it is not possible to conform to this standard in the peak season and workers 
want more overtime as they get double the basic rate. If we only gave the workers 48 hours of 
overtime per month, they would leave and go elsewhere.”  
The above results in suppliers developing ‘work-arounds’ that allow them to mock comply 
with certain standards that are not amenable to the workforce. For example, Supplier D’s HR 
Manager referred to the “charade” whereby his factory holds a gold WRAP certificate – the 
highest possible rating for an initial audit – and has zero violations according to its SEDEX 
rating, yet frequently flaunts working hour regulations. Suppliers are beating the system in 
various ways, including – according to the HR managers of suppliers B and D – by 
maintaining two timesheets: one shown to buyers/auditors, which complies with regulations; 
and one used to pay workers, which reflects actual practice. It was claimed in suppliers B and 
D that not only do employees participate – knowing it is in their interests if they want to 
retain overtime – but that auditors and buyers are also sometimes aware of the charade. For 
example, Supplier B’s Deputy Managing Director stated that: “Some customers understand 
the issue with overtime and do not ask to see how much overtime workers have done, or they 
will just check that workers have been paid fairly for their hours and were not forced to work. 
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If, at the end of the year, they think you have done too much overtime, they will ask you to cut 
back but they won’t fail the factory ... But Buyer XYZ’s audits are carried out by third-party 
auditors who are not very understanding of this dilemma. So, we have to maintain two sets of 
records. The buyer and auditors are well aware of this but they turn a blind eye [as long it is 
hidden from them].” There appears to be inertia on changes to overtime practices from all 
sides, as it would, for example, increase costs for both buyers and suppliers. Other mock 
compliance examples related to healthcare, and were presumably less supported by the 
workforce. Local law states that a full-time doctor and nurse should be employed in a factory 
with >350 employees. Yet the HR Director and Compliance Manager of Supplier A admitted 
that medical staffs are only present on an audit day. 
Some suppliers claimed that their buyers were not genuinely serious about social 
sustainability and were only interested in improving their reputation and avoiding bad 
publicity. It was also argued that if MNCs took greater interest in their tier two or three 
suppliers, then they would uncover more alarming social problems in their supply chains. 
One example from Supplier B’s Deputy Managing Director involved the use of Uzbekistan 
cotton, which was banned in the US and EU following widespread reports that children and 
convicts were used to pick the cotton. Yet he believes that about 40% of cotton used in 
Bangladesh’s RMG industry comes from Uzbekistan. He signs an agreement each year to 
confirm Uzbek cotton is not used but suspects his cotton supplier, which sources its cotton 
from a range of countries, buys from Uzbekistan, and that buyers are also aware that this is 
likely. Once cotton has been spun into thread, it is impossible to detect its origins. Both the 
examples on timesheets and Uzbek cotton imply that some buyers may ignore non-
compliance providing it is not visible or cannot be traced to them, meaning they can deny 
knowledge of its existence if confronted.  
All four suppliers found it difficult to fully adhere to codes of conduct based on the 
cultural and socio-economic conditions of developed countries. This included the idea of a 
nursery or childcare centre in the place of work. This is largely unheard of in Bangladesh – 
infants are typically cared for by another relative when their guardian is at work – but is 
stipulated as a requirement in buyer codes of conduct. Hence, suppliers must bear the cost, 
but the facility itself is only used when auditors are expected. This highlights the lack of 
alignment between the codes of conduct and the local context, which leads to further mock 
compliance. Supplier C’s HR Manager explained that: “We have this facility and incur the 
cost just because buyers do not understand the reality of our country. This is a total waste of 
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money.” In fact, Buyer 2’s Head of Compliance was aware of this and acknowledged “some 
suppliers create a day care centre just for the sake of compliance”.  
Finally, part of the reason why suppliers can circumvent aspects of codes of conduct is 
that corruption is rife, including, it was alleged, involving government officials. Supplier A’s 
Compliance Manager was scathing in his comments: “The government labour agency comes 
to audit every 6 months, but mainly they come for money. They will see the violations, but if 
you bribe them they will go away and just ask you not to do it in the future.” This lack of law 
enforcement is a major barrier to driving through social reform and was acknowledged by all 
four suppliers and by Buyer 2. 
 
5.4 Summary of Barriers to Social Sustainability 
From sections 5.2 and 5.3, it follows that the barriers to social sustainability in Bangladesh’s 
RMG industry include: pressure to reduce prices and buyer reluctance to share 
implementation costs; fraught relationships between actors, most prominently between 
suppliers and third-party auditors; suppliers covering up non-compliance (mock compliance); 
buyers ignoring violations, thereby failing to drive through genuine improvements; 
misalignment between codes of conduct and local culture; and, a lack of government support 
or law enforcement. Building on this, Section 6 explores how the barriers to social 
sustainability could be, and are being, overcome. 
 
6. Enablers of Social Sustainability (RQ3) 
A primary enabler of social sustainability identified by three suppliers and Buyer 2 was 
higher prices and larger orders for compliant factories to incentivise improvements. For 
example, with higher prices, the suppliers argued they would be able to give back more to 
society. But while Buyer 1’s Supply Chain Manager agreed that larger orders could enable 
improvements, he argued that social sustainability must be evaluated alongside many other 
factors when awarding contracts – not only environmental sustainability, but factors like 
capacity availability and delivery performance: “We must award orders according to 
capacity. And even if a supplier performs well in terms of compliance, we have to be sure that 
they can deliver.” 
One difficulty with social sustainability is that different buyers have different codes of 
conduct. It is therefore unsurprising that two suppliers suggested establishing a single RMG 
industry code of conduct. This would increase clarity over what a supplier should achieve, 
may lead to more consistent auditing, and make it easier for suppliers to win contracts from 
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new buyers as there may not be the need for a new audit. Beyond industry-level uniformity, 
three suppliers argued that codes of conduct should reflect broader cultural and socio-
economic conditions. For example, Supplier C’s HR Manager stressed that buyers “need to 
do a root cause analysis of why labour laws are violated in Bangladesh.” Returning to the 
problem of child labour being diverted to other industries (from Section 5.2), Supplier B’s 
Managing Director explained that: “the garments industry is the most regulated industry in 
the country; we are shifting child labour to more dangerous professions, such as 
construction, which are not monitored and where workers do not get proper or timely 
wages”. It was suggested that a solution more considerate of the local context would be to 
introduce age brackets for employees linked to the level of stress and potential hazard they 
are exposed to, allowing children to earn an income in the RMG industry but in a safe way 
while also receiving an education from the supplier. Similarly, it was suggested that codes of 
conduct should not stipulate a nursery be available if local culture means employees would 
not use this service. 
More generally, it was felt that there needs to be a shift from the auditing and monitoring 
of suppliers towards supplier development. Indeed, Buyer 2’s Head of Compliance predicted 
that, in the future, “buyers will shift from auditing to supplier development” while Supplier 
C’s HR Manager acknowledged that buyers are beginning to change their approach from 
“policing duties” to “factory development”. Similarly, another enabler was support from 
buyers for education and training. It was also suggested that a culture of trust and openness 
should be fostered, whereby a supplier can go to a buyer when they are having difficulties 
with a particular improvement to obtain advice without feeling this will impact future orders. 
In fact, Buyer 2’s Head of Compliance suggested that he would like to work with suppliers to 
solve their problems. For example, he realises that working-hour violations are common and 
cannot be stopped immediately but that, by working together, compliance could gradually be 
achieved. He explained: “If suppliers are forced to hide, buyers can’t help them rectify the 
process ... we encourage suppliers to show us the original timesheets, even if they are 
violating labour laws because then we can help them to address the issues.” Buyer 2’s open 
approach was appreciated by the factory compliance managers of suppliers C and D, both of 
which supply directly to Buyer 2. According to Supplier C’s Compliance Manager, “the 
requirement of [Buyer 2] is that you have to show the original documents, even if you are 
violating the labour law.” But he also added: “It is only recently that they have begun to 
understand the practical realities.”  
21 
 
But while openness would be beneficial to bringing about gradual change, suppliers and 
buyers appear to accept that on audit day, when future orders are potentially at stake, the 
atmosphere changes and can be rather tense and adversarial – suppliers often revert to hiding 
violations, meaning auditors may revert to trying to find the faults they are hiding. Buyer 2’s 
Head of Compliance explained that: “We try to work together with suppliers to solve 
problems. But on audit day, this does not always happen. For example, a factory tried to hide 
working hour violations during an audit and got a poor rating, which hampered its orders. 
But then when I called the supplier to the office for a meeting where the negative environment 
of the audit was not there ... he came with all his original records and I was able to show him 
where he made the mistake and how to rectify it.”  
Education and training, as suggested above, can be important not only for suppliers but for 
employees in the local offices of buyers as well, as noted by Buyer 1. While the headquarters 
of MNCs may be far removed from the local context in Bangladesh, their employees in 
Bangladesh will share many of the same cultural values and experience the same socio-
economic conditions as the suppliers. Buyer 1’s Supply Chain Manager explained that its 
“[local] compliance team goes to the UK head office or the India regional office for training 
... sometimes people also come from abroad to train them. We are also sent guidelines on 
what we should follow and what our suppliers should follow, with examples of best practice.” 
The final enabler of social sustainability is law enforcement. Supplier B is the only 
supplier in our study located in the tightly regulated and enforced Export Processing Zone 
(EPZ) – an area where compliance must be high but, in return, duties are lower and customs 
intervene less, making import/export more straightforward – and has greater adherence to 
social standards than suppliers outside the zone. If labour laws, for example, were more 
readily enforced in factories outside the EPZ then these suppliers would have to improve their 
social standards. Given that around 80% of the country’s exports are from the RMG industry, 
there must surely be an incentive to ensuring the sector meets the expectations of global 
markets so the economy can continue to benefit from garment manufacture. 
 
7. Discussion: Social Sustainability using the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) Lens 
This paper has included the ‘ugly’ side of social sustainability implementation, including, for 
example, evidence of mock compliance by suppliers, such as hiding violations, and unethical 
behaviour by buyers, such as turning a ‘blind eye’ to violations. These aspects can be 
interpreted as costs associated with buyer-supplier transactions and point to TCE, as 
introduced in Section 2.2.1, as a potentially useful theoretical lens for understanding 
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implementation in developing country suppliers. Here, we use TCE and the three propositions 
from Grover and Malhotra (2003) to interpret our findings. 
The first proposition from Grover and Malhotra (2003) states that transaction costs are 
higher under conditions of high asset specificity. An example of a human asset-specific 
investment in our context is when a buyer educates and trains a supplier’s personnel in their 
code of conduct. This appears to be a common enabler of social sustainability 
implementation, as evident from Table II. But when a buyer makes such a human capital 
investment, it cannot be easily redeployed should the supply relationship be terminated. This 
may explain why buyers are often reluctant to make such investments and have, instead, often 
relied on monitoring and auditing. This, however, is argued to be a short term approach – 
such human capital investments could actually decrease a buyer’s future transaction costs. In 
terms of physical assets, social sustainability implementation relies, for example, on activities 
that are costly in the short term, like increasing aisle widths between machinists and 
providing fire safety equipment. But, again, such physical asset investments can be hugely 
beneficial in the long term, leading to larger customer orders, increased productivity and 
better employee retention rates. Unlike human assets, these do not appear highly specific 
investments, as buyer codes of conduct have similar basic requirements. This may explain 
why buyers are reluctant to share the costs of such initiatives (see Table II). Overall, our data 
partly supports Grover and Malhotra’s (2003) first proposition: in this context, asset-specific 
investments mainly relate to human assets. Furthermore, although greater asset specificity 
may increase transaction costs in the short term, they could contribute to reducing costs in the 
longer term – this dimension is not captured in the proposition. 
The second proposition from Grover and Malhotra (2003) states that bounded rationality 
and opportunism give rise, under conditions of high uncertainty, to higher transaction costs. 
Social sustainability implementation features environmental uncertainty because of ex-ante 
information asymmetry, i.e. an inability to ascertain upfront a supplier’s true nature. Direct 
transaction costs are incurred by the buyer through the initial technical and social audits that 
support supplier selection, but the quality of the selection decision is bounded and the risk of 
future losses remains if an inappropriate supplier is chosen. In addition, behavioural 
uncertainty includes the ex-post costs of monitoring a supplier’s social performance and of 
dealing with opportunistic supplier behaviour. This includes mock compliance, which, if 
leaked to the media, could result in significant damage to a buyer’s reputation. Yet our data 
suggests that buyers are generally only concerned with their immediate suppliers and not with 
the compliance of tier-two suppliers, while suppliers themselves may neglect to inform 
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buyers that they are subcontracting work or fail to disclose details on their suppliers (like 
location). Beyond our data, in the case of the Rana Plaza building collapse and both the 
recent factory fires in Bangladesh, the major buyers – e.g. Benetton, Wal-Mart and Inditex – 
denied knowing their brands were being made in those factories (Bloomberg, 2012, New 
York Times, 2012, Huffington Post, 2013). They blamed middlemen and suppliers for 
subcontracting to cheaper, non-compliant factories without their knowledge (Guardian, 2012, 
BBC, 2013b, Huffington Post, 2013). In conclusion, there appears to be full support for 
Grover and Malhotra’s (2003) second proposition: social sustainability implementation is 
characterised by high levels of environmental and behavioural uncertainty as well as buyers’ 
bounded rationality and supplier opportunism. This leads to high transaction costs, including 
monitoring and enforcement costs and indirect costs deriving from reputation damage. 
Finally, the third proposition from Grover and Malhotra (2003) focuses on the choice of 
governance structure. It was suggested that, in general, low transaction costs favour market 
governance, while high transaction costs favour hierarchical governance. Indeed, our data 
suggests that a market form of governance is unsuitable due to the high levels of bounded 
rationality and opportunistic behaviour. Under a pure market governance scenario, a buyer’s 
only supplier selection criterion would be passing the initial audit or conforming to a 
particular accepted ethical standard, e.g. WRAP. But this leaves a buyer vulnerable to the 
type of opportunistic behaviour we have described. Instead, a hierarchical governance 
structure could be more suitable for enforcing socially sustainable practices in developing 
country suppliers, given the high transaction costs. But an arms-length hierarchical approach 
was heavily criticised by the four suppliers, while buyers participating in supplier 
development have been applauded. One of the criticisms of TCE has been that it underplays 
the impact that trust can have on offsetting the failures of formal contracts and controls 
(Grover and Malhotra, 2003). Meanwhile, our data suggested, for example, that Buyer 2 
became more effective in terms of social sustainability implementation by gaining the trust of 
its suppliers. Overall, a combination of monitoring and trust building, actively developing 
and training suppliers, and taking the cultural context into account may be the most efficient 
way forward. In conclusion, our data partly supports Grover and Malhotra’s (2003) final 
proposition. Social sustainability implementation is characterised by high transaction costs, 
which calls for vertically integrated forms of governance. But a genuine supplier 
development and capacity building approach is also needed and is fundamental to achieving a 




8. Conclusion   
Many Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) are struggling with the social sustainability of 
their supply chains, particularly when sourcing from developing countries. There has been a 
need to investigate why some developing country suppliers are adopting socially sustainable 
practices and how the implementation process is both impeded and facilitated. Prior empirical 
studies have mainly been in the context of developed countries or focused on the buyer’s 
perspective. In contrast, this paper has presented an exploratory study into social 
sustainability in the labour intensive Ready Made Garments (RMG) industry of Bangladesh, 
a developing country. It has combined the perspectives of buyers and suppliers, describing 
the ground realities of social sustainability. Our findings on the motivators, barriers and 
enablers of social sustainability are briefly summarised below, while the richness of our data 
adds to understanding in the literature of the complexities of implementing social 
sustainability in developing countries. In addition, Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory 
has been used to interpret our findings, which were found to either fully or partially support 
three propositions on TCE from Grover and Malhotra (2003). 
Some of our findings on the motivators, barriers and enablers simply support prior 
research, but a number of novel factors are also identified (see Table II). For example, we 
have indentified competition for skilled labour as an important motivator, which – to the best 
of our knowledge – has not been highlighted previously. The barriers to implementation are 
often present because codes of conduct do not reflect the local context of Bangladesh. Strictly 
adhering to the regulations could mean a supplier loses its skilled labour and that children are 
diverted to other more hazardous industries. Other novel barriers to full implementation relate 
to the auditing process itself, with friction particularly between suppliers and third-party 
auditors, mock compliance, and the curious case of buyers overlooking certain violations, 
suggesting they may be simply interested in market perceptions and not necessarily in 
genuinely improving supplier conditions. Finally, some of the enablers we have identified 
could also not be found in the literature, including: adopting a single, industry-wide code of 
conduct to improve consistency; and, considering the cultural and socio-economic conditions 
of the developing country during the implementation process. 
 
8.1 Managerial Implications 
The insights provided can help managers improve the social sustainability of their supply 
chains. For example, being aware of the key motivators, barriers and enablers may help 
managers promote good practice and predict the challenges they are likely to face in 
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improving the social sustainability of their supply chains, allowing them to be either avoided 
or overcome. Furthermore, part of our analysis using TCE highlighted the need for buyers to 
move beyond their immediate suppliers and incorporate second- and possibly third-tier 
suppliers in the implementation process. This would overcome some forms of opportunistic 
behaviour, like unauthorised subcontracting, and attenuate transaction costs. Without such 
steps, more tragedies like the recent building collapse and factory fires are inevitable and 
buyers will continue to leave themselves vulnerable to reputation damage. 
 
8.2 Limitations and Future Research 
This paper is based on studying four suppliers and two buyers. Further research is therefore 
required to determine whether there are other factors relevant to Bangladesh’s RMG industry 
beyond those observed in this limited set of cases. This could involve studying more buyers 
and suppliers, but also a broader range of stakeholders, including third-party auditors, NGOs, 
trade associations, workers and government officials. For example, prior literature has 
indicated that NGOs can act as enablers of sustainability implementation (Maignan et al., 
2002, Walker and Jones, 2012), yet the suppliers in our study had a negative perception of the 
role played by NGOs. This is counter-intuitive and warrants further investigation. For 
example, perhaps there is a lack of communication between the two parties and a lack of 
trust, with NGOs seen as a potential threat to future contracts. Standards in second-tier 
suppliers, which are less visible and likely to lag further behind, could also be investigated. 
To obtain similarly rich and candid data to that presented here, it would again be important to 
win the trust and confidence of interviewees.  
To add generality to the motivating factors, barriers and enablers identified, a survey of 
buyers and suppliers could also be conducted. Meanwhile, further motivation for 
implementation could be generated by quantifying the impact of social sustainability, e.g. via 
an event study analysis on the share price effects of both bad publicity and launching 
improvement programmes. Further work could also be conducted to assess the generality of 
our findings to other manufacturing industries and countries. We might find, for example, 
that other labour intensive manufacturing industries and countries with similar cultural values 
and socio-economic conditions face the same sorts of challenges to those identified in 
Bangladesh’s RMG industry. But it may also be interesting to explore service contexts, which 
are also typically highly labour intensive but often feature higher levels of visibility and 
stronger interactions with consumers. 
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Finally, we have found TCE to be a useful theoretical lens, but future research could 
employ other established theories, e.g. stakeholder theory or institutional theory. The former 
could help to understand the dynamics between stakeholders and the roles they play in social 
sustainability implementation. The latter could be used to further investigate how internal and 
external isomorphic pressures influence the propagation of socially sustainable practices 
across supply chains. 
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Table I: Overview of Suppliers and Buyers Interviewed 
 
Company Interviewee(s) Sector 





 Supplier A 
 
Managing Director;  
Executive Director;  
HRD & Compliance 
Manager 
Manufacturing (cutting & making) - 
Knitwear, e.g. t-shirts, 




Managing Director;  
Deputy Managing 
Director;  
HR Manager  
Manufacturing (cutting & making) - 
Lingerie 1,500 workers 
Supplier C 
 
Group HR & 
Compliance Manager  
Manufacturing (cutting & making) - 
sweaters and jeans 2,400 workers 
Supplier D 
 
Managing Director;  
Chief Operating 
Officer;  
Compliance Manager  
Manufacturing (cutting & making) - 
sweaters 7,000 workers 
Buyer 1 





 UK Apparel Retailer £9.74 billion 





Table II: Key Motivational Factors, Barriers and Enablers from the Case Study Evidence
 
Factors from the Literature  
(novel findings unique to our research 
marked by X) 
Cases Providing Supporting Evidence  
 Supplier A Supplier B Supplier C Supplier D Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Total 
Motivational Factors   
External stakeholder pressure Beschorner and Müller  (2007); Tencati et al.(2008); Yu (2008) * * * * * * 6 
Owner characteristics Baden et al. (2009); Walker and Jones (2012) * * * *   4 
Competition amongst suppliers for skilled 
labour X  *  *   2 
Economic Benefits Tencati et al.(2008) * * * * * * 6 
Barriers   
Pressure to reduce prices and lack of cost 
sharing 
Yu (2008); Baden et al.(2009);Walker and 
Jones (2012)   * * * *  * 5 
Confrontational relationships, e.g. between 
suppliers and 3rd party auditors X * * * *  * 5 
Suppliers covering up a lack of compliance 
– ‘mock’ compliance X * * * * * * 6 
Buyers accepting mock 
compliance/overlooking supplier violations X * * * *   4 
Misalignment between codes of conduct and 
local culture X * * * *  * 5 
Lack of government support or enforcement 
of labour laws Yu, (2008) * * * *  * 5 
Enablers   
Awarding better prices or larger orders to 
the most compliant factories Yu (2008); Gugler and Shi, (2009) * *  *  * 4 
Having a single industry wide code of 
conduct X *   *   2 
Codes of conduct that reflect culture and 
socio-economic conditions X  * * *   3 
Moving towards supplier development 
rather than auditing 
Jorgensen and Knudsen (2006);  Lim and 
Phillips (2008)  * * *  * 4 
Education and training Boyd et al. (2007); Hall and Matos (2010) *  *  * * 4 
Treating suppliers as partners and building a 
sense of trust and openness 
Lim and Phillips (2008); Tencati et 
al.(2008)  * * *  * 4 
Internal codes of conduct for buyers X     *  1 



















Figure 1: Exploratory Research Framework 
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